Failure Analysis
Ezubao was a Ponzi scheme from inception, not a failed startup. The mechanics: 95% of listed projects were fabricated. The platform created fake borrowers,...
Ezubao promised Chinese retail investors extraordinary returns (9-14.6% annually) by pooling their money into what appeared to be legitimate peer-to-peer lending for infrastructure and leasing projects. The psychological hook was powerful: it offered middle-class Chinese citizens—who faced limited investment options due to capital controls and a volatile stock market—a seemingly safe, government-adjacent alternative to low-yield bank deposits. The platform leveraged China's P2P lending boom (2013-2015), where tech-enabled finance felt modern and trustworthy. Ezubao's slick mobile app, celebrity endorsements, and omnipresent subway advertising created an aura of legitimacy. The 'why' was simple: it tapped into a massive unmet need for yield in a savings-heavy economy where real estate was overheated and traditional wealth management products were opaque. For investors, it felt like participating in China's infrastructure growth story with tech-era convenience.
Ezubao was a Ponzi scheme from inception, not a failed startup. The mechanics: 95% of listed projects were fabricated. The platform created fake borrowers,...
China's P2P lending industry collapsed post-2016 due to Ezubao and similar frauds, triggering a regulatory crackdown that eliminated 99% of platforms by 2021. Today,...
Business Model Lesson: High fixed returns (9-14%) in a lending model are a red flag. Legitimate P2P lending has variable returns tied to borrower...
China's P2P lending market effectively died after 2016 (from 5,000+ platforms to near-zero by 2021). However, the underlying demand—middle-class Chinese seeking 6-10% returns on...
Rebuilding trust in P2P lending post-Ezubao requires navigating China's draconian fintech regulations (2016-present crackdown), overcoming deep retail investor trauma, and competing against state-backed wealth...
The original Ponzi model scaled horrifyingly well—900,000 investors in 18 months—because it had negative unit economics by design (paying old investors with new money)...
Build a permissioned blockchain ledger where each invoice is tokenized with metadata (supplier ID, buyer ID, invoice amount, due date, verification hash from ERP).
Recruit 3-5 family offices or corporate treasuries (minimum $5M commitment each) as pilot investors. Offer 7% target yield with first-loss protection (platform takes first 2% of defaults).
Manually underwrite the first 20 invoices (credit check on buyer, not supplier) and advance funds to suppliers. Track repayment and default rates over 90 days.
Automate credit scoring using buyer payment history data. Launch self-service supplier portal where SMEs upload invoices, get instant pre-approval, and receive funds in 48 hours.
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